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SILENT AT SENTENCING: WAIVER DOCTRINE AND A
CAPITAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO PRESENT MITIGATING
EVIDENCE AFTER SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN
Dale E. Ho*
ABSTRACT
The consideration of mitigating evidence—evidence that weighs against
the imposition of the death penalty in a capital defendant’s individual
case—has been deemed a “constitutionally indispensable” feature of a
valid capital sentencing scheme. And yet, Jeffrey Landrigan, like many
capital defendants, was sentenced to death without the consideration of any
mitigating evidence whatsoever. Landrigan’s trial counsel failed to uncover
substantial evidence of Landrigan’s history of severe physical and sexual
abuse as a child, and of the possible biological effects of his mother’s
alcohol and drug abuse. Every member of the Ninth Circuit en banc panel
considering his case deemed his counsel’s performance to be objectively
unreasonable. But the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, denied Landrigan
habeas relief, on the grounds that he had “waived” his right to present
mitigating evidence. In so doing, the Court ignored longstanding precedent
holding that a criminal defendant’s waiver of a constitutionally protected
trial right can only be valid if the record affirmatively establishes that the
defendant made his waiver with an understanding of the nature of the right
at stake and of the consequences of waiving it. Moreover, the Court’s
decision in Landrigan raises substantial concerns under the Eighth
Amendment, increasing the likelihood that capital defendants in future
cases will be sentenced without the presentation of mitigating evidence,
thus undermining the reliability and integrity of capital sentencing. Just as
an ordinary criminal defendant must be informed of and aware of the
consequences if he opts to waive the right to trial itself, so too should
similar safeguards attach where a capital defendant purportedly waives his
right to present a mitigation case during sentencing proceedings, which are,
in essence, a second trial. Any other result would be strangely incongruous,
rendering the right to present mitigating evidence as the lone trial right of
criminal defendants that is not subject to a “knowing and voluntary”
requirement. Given the confusion amongst the lower courts on this issue,
the establishment of a knowing and voluntary requirement in this context
makes sense not only from a perspective of judicial economy, but also to
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minimize the number of capital defendants sentenced to death without
presenting a case in mitigation, a phenomenon that is abhorrent to the
Eighth Amendment’s proscription against the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1982, Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted in Oklahoma of seconddegree murder.1 In 1989, he escaped from prison and committed another
homicide, and, at his subsequent trial, he was convicted of first-degree
capital murder.2 During the sentencing phase of his trial, the prosecution
presented evidence that led the trial court to conclude that Landrigan was
eligible for the death penalty based on the presence of two statutory
aggravating factors: (1) Landrigan committed the murder for pecuniary
gain; and (2) he had been previously convicted of two violent felonies.3
1. Schriro v. Landrigan (Landrigan III), 550 U.S. 465, 469 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 470–71.
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The defense, however, presented no evidence during sentencing
proceedings,4 and the court, with no evidence of mitigating factors as a
counterweight, sentenced Landrigan to death.
During post-conviction proceedings, Landrigan claimed his counsel was
ineffective by failing to investigate the possible “‘biological component’”
of his violent behavior,5 through interviews of Landrigan’s father and other
relatives, who could have described aspects of Landrigan’s history
including the following facts:
Landrigan’s birth parents were troubled individuals who
abused drugs and alcohol; Landrigan’s biological father was a
violent man who, at the time of Landrigan’s trial, was on
death row in Arkansas; Landrigan’s mother abandoned
Landrigan when he was six months old, leaving him in a day
nursery and never returning; Landrigan was later adopted, but
unfortunately, his adoptive mother was also an alcoholic, at
times consuming a fifth of vodka or more a day until she
passed out; she would frequently slap him and once even hit
him with a frying pan; his childhood was difficult—he
exhibited abandonment and attachment problems, had
difficulty sleeping, and had violent temper tantrums even at a
very early age; Landrigan had serious drug and alcohol
problems while very young, and he even overdosed in class in
eighth or ninth grade; at the time he committed the murder in
Arizona, he had used amphetamines for forty-two straight
days and had slept on only about fourteen of those days.6
A neuropsychologist later reported that Landrigan’s experiences
resulted in disordered behavior that was beyond his control, and “left him
unable to ‘function in a society that expects individuals to operate in an
organized and adaptive manner, taking into account the actions and
consequences of their behavior and their impact on society and its
individual members.’”7 In his petition for habeas corpus, Landrigan alleged
that his counsel’s failure to uncover and present this evidence rose to the
level of ineffective assistance, and sought a new sentencing proceeding.8

4. See id. at 469–70. Defense counsel did, however, submit a sentencing memorandum prior
to the sentencing hearing. See Landrigan v. Stewart (Landrigan I), 272 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
2001).
5. Id.
6. Landrigan v. Schriro (Landrigan II), 441 F.3d 638, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2006).
7. Id. at 645.
8. Id. at 641.
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The initial federal habeas court denied Landrigan’s claim and a panel of
the Ninth Circuit affirmed,9 but an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit
ultimately reversed and ordered habeas relief.10 Notably, every judge from
the en banc panel, including the two dissenters, agreed that Landrigan’s
trial counsel—by failing to uncover the plethora of relevant mitigating
evidence described above—fell below prevailing professional standards.11
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Landrigan seemed to have reasonably
good odds; since 2000, the Court had granted habeas relief in three capital
cases where trial counsel had failed to conduct an adequate investigation
into available mitigating evidence.12 This time, however, was different. By
a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that Landrigan could not make a claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel.13 Justice Thomas’ opinion held that
Landrigan had not been prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to conduct
a thorough investigation into available mitigating evidence because
Landrigan himself had “interfere[d] with counsel’s efforts to present
mitigating evidence to [the] sentencing court.”14 Justice Thomas based this
conclusion on the fact that trial counsel had sought to elicit testimony from
Landrigan’s ex-wife and biological mother, but that, at Landrigan’s
request, both women refused to testify.15 In essence, the majority surmised
that Landrigan had waived his right to present mitigating evidence, and
thus, concluded that any claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based
on counsel’s performance during sentencing was procedurally barred.
Thus, in spite of the imperative under the Eighth Amendment to consider
the individual history and characteristics of a capital defendant before
imposing the death penalty, Landrigan’s death sentence, which had
originally been imposed without the consideration of substantial evidence
of Landrigan’s childhood abuse, was reinstated.16
This Article argues that the Landrigan majority incorrectly applied
waiver doctrine to a capital defendant’s Eighth Amendment right to present
mitigating evidence, the exercise of which represents a defendant’s last line
of defense against the imposition of the death penalty. Although a criminal
defendant may of course waive constitutionally protected rights associated
with trial—such as the right to counsel, the right to confront his accusers,
and the right to a jury—the Supreme Court has established that a valid
9. Landrigan I, 272 F.3d 1221, 1223–24 (2001).
10. Landrigan II, 441 F.3d at 650.
11. Id. (Bea, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority’s conclusion that counsel’s limited
investigation of Landrigan’s background fell below the standards of professional representation
prevailing in 1990.”).
12. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000).
13. Landrigan III, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007).
14. Id. at 475–76, 478.
15. Id. at 469.
16. Id. at 480–81.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss3/4

4

Ho: Silent at Sentencing: Waiver Doctrine and a Capital Defendant's R

2010]

SILENT AT SENTENCING

725

waiver of these constitutionally protected trial rights requires an
affirmative showing on the record that the defendant’s choice is knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent (in shorthand, a “knowing and voluntary
requirement”). The Court’s failure in Landrigan to apply a similar standard
where a capital defendant “waives” his right to present mitigating evidence
is incongruous with well-established waiver doctrine, and creates an
unacceptable risk of error in capital sentencing. A knowing and voluntary
requirement must be applied in future cases where a defendant purportedly
waives the presentation of mitigating evidence during sentencing.
Part II of this Article examines the nature of Landrigan’s
ineffectiveness claim and the contours of the Court’s ruling. Although the
Court in Landrigan declined to establish a knowing and voluntary
requirement in the context of a purported waiver of mitigation, its ruling
was quite limited, leaving open the possibility of establishing such a
requirement in a future case.
Part III argues that the result in Landrigan should have been different,
contextualizing the decision within (1) waiver doctrine and (2) modern
capital punishment jurisprudence. The right to present mitigating evidence
during sentencing has been at the core of the Court’s capital punishment
jurisprudence since the restoration of the death penalty to constitutional
status in Gregg v. Georgia.17 Time and again, the Court’s capital
punishment decisions have emphasized the principle that, if the death
penalty is to be permissible under the Eighth Amendment, it must not be
meted out arbitrarily. Rather, the death penalty must be administered in
such a way that each capital defendant is evaluated as an individual, and
that only the proverbial “worst of the worst” offenders receive the ultimate
sanction. The presentation and consideration of evidence that weighs
against the imposition of the death penalty has therefore been described as
a “constitutionally indispensable” part of a valid capital sentencing
scheme.18 Indeed, an adequate presentation of mitigating evidence is
literally quite often the difference between life and death.19 Given that a
criminal defendant’s other constitutionally protected rights associated with
trial are typically subject to a knowing and voluntary requirement, the
Court’s failure in Landrigan to apply such a requirement in this particular
context makes little sense.
Finally, Part IV examines how a knowing and voluntary requirement
might play out in practice, and examines the prospects for the
establishment of such a requirement in future litigation. To implement a
knowing and voluntary requirement, clear and consistent procedures
should be established in the form of a uniform colloquy requirement
whereby a sentencing court can ensure that a defendant, at a minimum,
17. 428 U.S. 153, 187, 193, 195, 197 (1976).
18. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 108.
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understands the scope of the right to present mitigating evidence and the
consequences of declining to exercise it.
At present, a uniform colloquy requirement remains elusive, as a split
exists amongst the courts of appeals and various state courts of last resort
regarding the treatment of a defendant’s waiver of mitigating evidence.
This situation is abhorrent to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against
arbitrariness in capital sentencing. But by adopting a rule requiring that any
purported waiver of mitigation must be knowing and voluntary, the Court
would harmonize treatment of mitigation with its waiver jurisprudence,
accord the proper respect due to a constitutional right of capital defendants,
and enhance reliability in capital sentencing.
II. SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN
A. Landrigan’s Ineffectiveness Claim
In order to understand the Landrigan majority’s reasoning, we must
begin with a closer look at Landrigan’s ineffectiveness claim. Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims have been the standard vehicle for addressing
situations in which a capital defendant’s case at sentencing (the “mitigation
case”) is deficient in some way. Under Strickland v. Washington,20 relief is
available based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim upon a
showing that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, if counsel had
performed adequately, the result of the proceeding—the trial, the
sentencing hearing, the appeal—would have been different.21
Accordingly, an ineffectiveness claim in the mitigation context is
typically structured as follows: (1) defense counsel (a) failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation into available mitigating evidence (a “mitigation
investigation”), thus leaving crucial evidence undiscovered, or (b) was
aware of, but made an unreasonable decision not to present relevant
mitigating evidence during sentencing proceedings; and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that the mitigating evidence that was not presented
20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21. Id. at 687. The standard for relief is therefore less exacting than a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
[A] defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not
altered the outcome in the case. . . . The result of a proceeding can be rendered
unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel
cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the
outcome.
Id. at 693–94. A reasonable probability of a different result is present when an evaluation of all of
the evidence that should have been before the jury is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694.
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during sentencing would have altered the sentencer’s decision to impose
the death penalty.22 These ineffectiveness claims are not uncommon.23 The
presentation of an adequate mitigation case is obviously of tremendous
importance, involving the highest possible stakes; it is almost a cliché now
to observe that “[t]he quality of counsel [in this context] is often literally a
matter of life and death for the capital defendant.”24
Landrigan seemed to have a good chance of success before the Supreme
Court. Since 2000, the Supreme Court had issued three decisions
sustaining ineffectiveness claims along the lines outlined above. The first
was a 2000 decision, Williams v. Taylor.25 Terry Williams was convicted
of committing a murder in the course of a robbery.26 During sentencing
proceedings, defense counsel called several witnesses, but they only
testified vaguely about Williams’ character, stating, for instance, that he
was a “‘nice boy’” and “not a violent person.”27 Counsel failed, however,
to present graphic and readily available evidence of Williams’ childhood
abuse, borderline mental retardation, and additional mental impairment
resulting from repeated head injuries.28 Nor did counsel present evidence
that Williams, during a previous period of incarceration, cooperated with
prison authorities by helping to “crack a prison drug ring.”29 Finally,
counsel failed to uncover the fact that the State’s own expert witness in the
case “believed that Williams, if kept in a ‘structured environment,’ would

22. Id. at 687, 693–94. A “reasonable probability” of a different result occurs when the full
“body of mitigation evidence” that could have been presented “might well have influenced the
jury’s appraisal of [the defendant’s] moral culpability.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398
(2000) (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 287 (1990)).
23. During the 2009-2010 term, the Court heard two cases involving claims of ineffective
assistance at sentencing. First, the Court granted relief in a per curiam opinion in Porter v.
McCollum. 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009). The petitioner in Porter, a Korean War veteran,
successfully argued that his trial attorney’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence,
including evidence of his honorable military service and the possibility that he might have suffered
from posttraumatic stress disorder, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 452–53, 455.
Meanwhile, in Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010), the Court denied a claim brought by a
petitioner who argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present substantial evidence of
petitioner’s mental retardation. Porter and Wood are, respectively, the fifth and sixth cases since
2000 in which the Court has addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the
failure to present certain mitigating evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 25–44.
24. Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1924 (1994); see also Thomas W. Brewer, The Attorney-Client Relationship
in Capital Cases and Its Impact on Juror Receptivity to Mitigation Evidence, 22 JUST. Q. 340, 342
(2005) (“[E]xperienced capital trial attorneys have long appreciated [that] effective presentation of
mitigation is, in many cases, the only thing standing between the defendant and a death sentence.”).
25. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
26. Id. at 367–68.
27. Id. at 369.
28. Id. at 370, 395.
29. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not pose a future danger to society.”30 The Court, by a 6-3 vote, sustained
Williams’ ineffectiveness claim, observing that Williams had “a
constitutionally protected right—to provide the jury with the mitigating
evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.”31
The Court’s ruling was based on its conclusion that trial counsel’s failure
to submit or discover the evidence described above was not a tactical
decision,32 but rather amounted to a simple failure to discharge his duty of
representation in an objectively reasonable manner.
Next was a 2003 decision, Wiggins v. Smith.33 Kevin Wiggins was
convicted of murdering a 77-year-old woman in her home during the
course of a burglary, and was sentenced to death.34 At sentencing, defense
counsel did not offer “any evidence of [Wiggins’] life history or family
background,”35 despite a wealth of available mitigating evidence. Wiggins
suffered from “severe physical and sexual abuse . . . at the hands of his
mother and . . . a series of foster parents.”36 Wiggins’ biological mother
was physically abusive (one notable example involved her burning his
hand on a hot stove); his first and second foster mothers also abused him
physically; the father in his second foster home raped him repeatedly; he
was gang-raped on multiple occasions by the sons of another foster mother;
and he spent some of his youth homeless.37 But Wiggins’ trial team simply
failed to uncover this evidence, having concentrated their time and
resources on the guilt phase of trial. Their only argument during sentencing
was based on residual doubt about Wiggins’ guilt.38 Given trial counsel’s
failure to uncover or present any of this evidence, the Court, by a 7-2 vote,
held that Wiggins was entitled to habeas relief.39
Finally, the Court’s 2005 decision in Rompilla v. Beard presented
substantially similar issues. Ronald Rompilla was sentenced to death for
stabbing the owner of a bar in Allentown, Pennsylvania.40 The jury found
the presence of three aggravating factors: (1) he committed the murder in
the course of another felony; (2) “the murder was committed by torture;”
and (3) he had a significant history of other felony convictions.41 While
defense counsel presented some mitigating evidence at sentencing, it did
not include substantial evidence concerning Rompilla’s troubled
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 396.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
Id. at 514–15.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 516–17.
Id. at 516–17.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 519.
545 U.S. 374, 377–78 (2005).
Id. at 378.
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childhood, his history of mental illness, and his struggle with alcoholism.42
As in Wiggins, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, determined that Rompilla was
entitled to relief based on trial counsel’s inadequate mitigation
investigation.43
Given the Court’s holdings in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, and the
plethora of similar evidence that Landrigan’s trial lawyers failed to uncover
and present during his sentencing proceedings, Landrigan seemed to have a
relatively persuasive claim for post-conviction relief. But this time, the
Court—minus Justice O’Connor, who had retired in the interim—found
that there was a factor present in Landrigan’s case that the majority deemed
meaningful: in the Court’s view, unlike Williams, Wiggins, or Rompilla,
Landrigan had “interfere[d] with [trial] counsel’s efforts to present
mitigating evidence to [the] sentencing court.”44 In other words, because
Landrigan himself had expressed a preference not to present certain forms
of mitigating evidence that were available at the time of trial, the majority
deemed Landrigan to have waived the presentation of all mitigating
evidence, and, consequently, any subsequent claim for ineffective
assistance based on his trial counsel’s failure to present a mitigation case
was barred.
The Court based its ruling almost entirely on the following exchange
between the trial judge and Landrigan:
THE COURT: Mr. Landrigan, have you instructed your
lawyer that you do not wish . . . to bring any mitigating
circumstances to my attention?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: Do you know what that means?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
42. Id. at 378–79.
43. Id. at 393.
44. Landrigan III, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007). This was, however, a dubious distinction. The
Rompilla Court, for instance, had observed that Rompilla had been “uninterested in helping”
counsel in their mitigation investigation, told counsel that his childhood and schooling had been
“normal,” and “was even actively obstructive by sending counsel off on false leads.” Rompilla, 545
U.S. at 381. But despite Rompilla’s refusal to assist in the development of a mitigation case, the
Court still held that his counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation, including
into Rompilla’s mental health, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 393. Moreover,
even if a defendant prefers that mitigating evidence not be presented during sentencing proceedings,
this would hardly seem to excuse a failure by counsel to conduct a mitigation investigation before
those proceedings begin. See Am. Bar Ass’n (ABA), Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1015 (2003)
[hereinafter ABA, Guidelines] (referencing Guideline 10.7 which states that a mitigation
investigation “should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing
upon penalty is not to be collected or presented”). The Commentary to Guideline 10.7 further notes:
“The duty to investigate exists regardless of the expressed desires of a client. Nor may counsel ‘sit
idly by, thinking that investigation would be futile.’” Id. at 1021 (footnotes omitted).
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THE COURT: Mr. Landrigan, are there mitigating
circumstances I should be aware of?
THE DEFENDANT: Not as far as I’m concerned.45
Examining this limited exchange in isolation, it is not wholly
unreasonable to surmise, as the majority did, that Landrigan did not in fact
wish to present any mitigation case whatsoever. But the record suggests
that the situation was not quite as simple as the Landrigan majority
suggested. At the time of trial, Landrigan’s attorney had not conducted a
thorough mitigation investigation, and had not discovered the full extent of
the wide range of mitigating evidence described above.46 Rather,
Landrigan’s trial counsel had spoken briefly with only two members of
Landrigan’s family—his ex-wife and his biological mother—and had
ascertained some general information about the substance abuse of
Landrigan’s biological mother and of Landrigan himself, but little in the
way of specifics.47 Defense counsel nevertheless sought to introduce
testimony from these two members of Landrigan’s family, but Landrigan
prevented him from doing so.48 As counsel explained to the court,
“[Landrigan] is adamant he does not want any testimony from his family,
specifically these two people that I have here, his mother, under subpoena,
and as well as having flown in his ex-wife.”49
These statements form the context for the exchange between the trial
judge and Landrigan excerpted above. Although the record is clear that
Landrigan was unwilling to have two particular people—his ex-wife and
his biological mother—testify, “there is no mention of any other witnesses,
and there is no indication that Landrigan would have precluded the
introduction of mitigating evidence by other means.”50 These possibilities
never arose, precisely because Landrigan’s attorney did not conduct a
thorough mitigation investigation. Landrigan therefore never had an
opportunity to make an informed decision about whether or not to present a
mitigation case. At best, his words are ambiguous—it is simply unclear
from the record whether Landrigan sought to prevent the introduction of
certain forms of mitigating evidence only, or if he sought to forgo all
mitigating evidence entirely.51
45. Landrigan III, 550 U.S. at 469.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 4–10.
47. See Landrigan II, 441 F.3d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 2006).
48. Id. at 645.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 646 (footnote omitted).
51. Of course, as the majority pointed out in its opinion, at the conclusion of sentencing
proceedings, when asked if he wanted to add anything else on his behalf, Landrigan stated, “‘I think
if you want to give me the death penalty, just bring it right on. I’m ready for it.’” Landrigan III, 550
U.S. 465, 470 (2007). This does not necessarily indicate, however, that prior to that point,
Landrigan sought to waive all mitigating evidence or that his waiver was informed and knowing.
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Nevertheless, on the basis of this ambiguous record, the majority
determined that Landrigan clearly did not want to present any mitigating
evidence. In so ruling, the majority also stated, “[w]e have never imposed
an ‘informed and knowing’ requirement upon a defendant’s decision not to
introduce evidence,” and added, “we have never required a specific
colloquy to ensure that a defendant knowingly and intelligently refused to
present mitigating evidence.”52
B. What Landrigan Did Not Decide
Although I contend that Landrigan was wrongly decided, it is worth
noting that Landrigan is not necessarily the final word on the applicability
of a knowing and voluntary requirement to a purported waiver of
mitigation. To be precise, Landrigan did not conclusively decide the
question seemingly at the heart of the case—namely, whether Landrigan
actually waived his right to present mitigating evidence. First, the Court
ruled that Landrigan was barred from raising the validity of his “waiver,”
by failing to present this claim in his state habeas petition.53 This is a
questionable proposition—after all, Landrigan could not raise the issue of
the “voluntariness” of his “waiver” until after the state courts had already
ruled that his ineffectiveness claim was barred by his purported waiver.
But the majority’s ruling that Landrigan was procedurally barred from
raising the voluntariness of his waiver has the effect of rendering the
majority’s subsequent comments on this issue dicta.
Second, and more importantly, the question on habeas review was not,
strictly speaking, whether a knowing and voluntary requirement should be
applied in this context, but rather, whether the Court had already
articulated such a requirement at the time of Landrigan’s first postconviction hearing.54 The only question on habeas review was whether the
state court reasonably concluded that no such knowing and voluntary
requirement was in place under existing federal law, not whether such a
requirement should in fact exist. Viewed from that perspective, the Court’s
ruling was not entirely inaccurate. When the majority stated that “[w]e
Although Landrigan expressed a preference not to present the limited mitigating evidence that his
counsel had adduced, the fact remained that, before Landrigan expressed that preference, defense
counsel had not conducted a thorough mitigation investigation. Id. As the Ninth Circuit put it in the
en banc decision below, “Landrigan’s . . . last-minute decision [not to present mitigating evidence]
cannot excuse his counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation prior to the sentencing.”
Landrigan II, 441 F.3d at 647. These issues are addressed more fully below. See infra text
accompanying notes 106–09.
52. Landrigan III, 550 U.S. at 479.
53. Id.
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may not grant
habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” at the time of the state court’s decision. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4

732

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

have never imposed an ‘informed and knowing’ requirement upon a
defendant’s decision not to introduce evidence,”55 this proclamation does
not have the force of a normative holding—it is merely a descriptive
statement of the state of the law at that point in time.56 As it is of course
true that, at the time that Landrigan’s habeas petition was adjudicated in
state court, a knowing and voluntary requirement had not yet been
articulated in this context by the Supreme Court, it at least arguably
followed that “it was not objectively unreasonable for [the state court that
first heard Landrigan’s claim] to conclude” that Landrigan was not entitled
to relief.57
This is not to say, however, that as a matter of first impression, that the
Court—or any lower courts—could not subsequently hold that a knowing
and voluntary requirement should be applied to a purported waiver of
mitigation, and the Court’s opinion appears to hold out just that possibility.
To the extent that the Court’s holding in Landrigan can and should be read
as based on the non-controversial statement that the Court had not yet, at
that point, imposed a knowing and voluntary requirement in this context,
the door remains open for the establishment of such a requirement in a case
of first impression. While the law concerning mitigation waiver at the time
of Landrigan’s first post-conviction hearing was arguably unclear, this
issue could still be the subject of future litigation.
III. A CRITICAL VIEW OF LANDRIGAN
Even assuming, however, that Landrigan can be read in the limited
fashion outlined above, its result is largely incongruous with the Court’s
decisions concerning the waiver of fundamental rights by criminal
defendants. The Court has consistently held that a criminal defendant’s
waiver of a constitutionally protected trial right is invalid unless there is an
affirmative showing that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. This
general rule is animated by a concern for fundamental fairness and a need
for reliability in criminal proceedings, imperatives that resonate even more
strongly in the capital context. Given the central role that mitigating
evidence plays in a constitutionally valid capital sentencing scheme, courts
should require that a valid waiver of mitigation be knowing and voluntary.
A. Waiver Doctrine
It is well-established that criminal defendants may waive
constitutionally protected rights. The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
55. Landrigan III, 550 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
56. See Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 45 (Pa. 2008) (citing Landrigan III, 550 U.S.
at 479) (“[T]he Supreme Court has more recently noted that there is, as yet, no constitutional
requirement that a defendant’s decision not to introduce evidence be ‘informed and knowing.’”)
(emphasis added).
57. Landrigan III, 550 U.S. at 478.
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self-incrimination,58 for instance, has been described by the Supreme Court
as “one of the ‘principles of a free government,’”59 but a defendant is
permitted to offer testimony against himself as part of the outcome of a
plea bargaining process.60 The Sixth Amendment, meanwhile, provides for
“t[h]e right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury”61 which, of
course, a defendant can waive by opting for a bench trial or by pleading
guilty.62 The Sixth Amendment also provides for a defendant’s right “to
have the assistance of counsel for his defence,” a right so fundamental that,
where a defendant cannot afford an attorney, the State is obligated to
provide him with one.63 But, just like the privilege against selfincrimination or the right to trial itself, the right to counsel can be waived,
and a defendant may proceed to trial in absence of counsel if he so
chooses.64
Thus, the Court has long recognized that criminal defendants may
waive trial rights that are expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. But
such a waiver is permitted only if it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
That is, a waiver of a particular right will not be found valid unless it is
established that the defendant freely chose not to exercise that right with a
full understanding of the scope of the right at stake and of the potential
consequences of waiving it. This “knowing and voluntary” requirement has
been applied to various constitutionally protected trial rights including the
right to a jury,65 the right to a speedy trial,66 the right to counsel,67 the right
to confront one’s accusers,68 the right to trial itself,69 and the protection
against double jeopardy.70
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[No person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
59. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632
(1886)).
60. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality of
plea bargaining, including the outcome in which a defendant agrees to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, or to one or only some of the counts of a multi-count indictment, and testify against himself
in exchange for a lesser sentence). I also note that, in entering a guilty plea, a defendant
simultaneously gives up his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
62. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (observing that “a defendant can . . . in
some instances waive his right to a trial by jury”).
63. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).
64. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
65. Singer, 380 U.S. at 34 (observing that “a defendant can . . . in some instances waive his
right to a trial by jury”).
66. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) (noting that waiver of right to speedy trial
must be made knowingly and voluntarily).
67. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942)). A defendant seeking to waive the right to counsel must “be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id.
68. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1966).
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In each of these contexts, the Supreme Court has made clear that a valid
waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record.71 Rather, the presumption
runs the other direction, as courts may “‘not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights,’”72 but must instead “‘indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.”73 The
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the presumption that a waiver is
not valid may be rebutted only if the record contains an affirmative
showing supporting a finding that the waiver was made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.74 The burden is generally on a trial court to
establish a record demonstrating that a defendant’s purported waiver of a
constitutional right was valid.75
The rationale for this strong presumption against waiver is based on the
notion that a criminal trial—with its attendant risks to the defendant’s
liberty—is a forum where an individual’s rights merit uniquely robust
protections. This may seem quite obvious, but it has wide-reaching
practical implications. Generally speaking, there is no knowing and
voluntary requirement with respect to waiver of certain constitutional
rights that are frequently implicated in criminal matters but which are not
directly related to trial—for instance, a person need not understand the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from search and seizure before waiving
it.76 But a knowing and voluntary requirement has been applied “without
exception” to those rights that are considered essential “to protect a fair

69. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (holding that a defendant may waive right
to trial and plead guilty so long as there is an affirmative showing that his plea was intelligent and
voluntary). The ability of a criminal defendant to waive the right to trial extends to the capital
context. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993) (holding that a capital defendant was
competent to plead guilty and waive the right to counsel).
70. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1981).
71. See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (1975) (holding that where a defendant waives the
right to counsel, the record must establish that the defendant does so knowingly and voluntarily);
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (noting a court “cannot presume a waiver of these . . . important federal
rights from a silent record”) (footnotes omitted).
72. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
73. Id. (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106
U.S. 408, 412 (1882)) (emphasis added).
74. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962))
(holding, where a defendant waives the right to trial, the record must show that the defendant
“intelligently and understandingly rejected” the option to exercise his right, and that “[a]nything
less is not waiver”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463–64. The requirement, with respect to
plea bargains, of an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant’s waiver is knowing and
voluntary is also codified under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(b)(2)–(d).
75. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 150 (1966) (per curiam).
76. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973).
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trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process.”77 As the Court
has explained:
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights
guaranteed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be
accorded the greatest possible opportunity to utilize every
facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial. Any
trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the
possibility that the trial reached an unfair result precisely
because all the protections specified in the Constitution were
not provided.78
Because of the high-stakes nature of criminal trials, the procedural
guarantees afforded criminal defendants by the Constitution are crucial to
preserving the integrity of the trial process. Thus, unlike other
constitutionally protected rights, these rights can only be waived upon a
showing that a purported waiver was knowing and voluntary.
B. The Right to Present Mitigating Evidence
The issue here, of course, is whether waiver doctrine properly applies to
a capital defendant’s right to present mitigating evidence. As I explain
below, the right to present mitigation evidence is, like all other trial rights
of criminal defendants, an essential feature of a fair and reliable trial, and
therefore merits robust procedural protections. In order to understand why
this is the case, we must turn to an examination of the nature of the
mitigation right and its jurisprudential development.
1. The Origins and Scope of the Right to Present Mitigating
Evidence
The fact that a capital defendant would have a constitutional right to
present mitigating evidence79 is by no means obvious. There is, of course,
no mention of the death penalty, let alone mitigating evidence, in the text
of the Eighth Amendment. One could think, for instance, that the facts
adduced in demonstrating a defendant’s guilt in committing capital murder
would provide a sentencer with sufficient information as to whether or not
to impose the death penalty.
And yet, a capital defendant’s right to present mitigating evidence is
grounded firmly in the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence, arising in
response to the Eighth Amendment concerns identified by the Supreme
Court in its seminal modern death penalty cases. These cases from the
77. Id. at 236–37.
78. Id. at 241.
79. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000).
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1970s were concerned with the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
The Court in Furman v. Georgia80 imposed a de facto nationwide
moratorium on the death penalty in 1972 because of the seemingly random
imposition of capital punishment,81 which the Court attributed to vague
capital sentencing statutes that gave virtually unbounded discretion to
sentencers.82 When the Court restored the death penalty to constitutional
status four years later in Gregg v. Georgia,83 it did so only on the condition
that the discretion of sentencers in capital cases would henceforth be
guided more strictly—i.e., that procedures would be in place to ensure that
only the proverbial “worst of the worst” offenders would be sentenced to
death.
Chief among those procedures was the bifurcation of capital trials,
dividing capital proceedings into essentially two separate trials: one trial to
determine guilt or innocence (the “guilt phase”), and, in the event of a
guilty verdict, a second trial to determine the sentence (the “sentencing
phase”). During the sentencing phase, a defendant would presumably
present evidence as in any other trial, but rather than evidence tending to
prove innocence, it would be evidence weighing against the death penalty
(“mitigating evidence”). Bifurcation was one of the key features of
Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme that the Court cited when it restored
capital punishment to constitutional status in Gregg,84 and although the
Court has never held that separate trials for guilt and punishment are
constitutionally required,85 today, “every jurisdiction that authorizes capital

80. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that imposition
and carrying out of death penalty cases before court would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment). After Furman, 860 death sentences nationwide were vacated, including 629
individuals that were on death row at the time. Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91
YALE L. J. 908, 915 (1982).
81. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40 (per curiam). Furman did not produce a single majority
opinion, but its holding can be summed up best by Justice Stewart’s statement that the death penalty
was “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence
of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.” Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
83. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
84. Id. at 195 (“[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed
in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these
concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing
authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with
standards to guide its use of the information.”).
85. The only time the Court addressed this issue directly was in a pre-Furman case. See
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971) (acknowledging the superiority of the bifurcated trial
and upholding Ohio’s then unitary capital trial procedures). Subsequently, Gregg did not expressly
hold that a bifurcated trial was constitutionally required. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
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punishment now requires that two separate phases take place.”86
Post-Gregg, the death penalty can only be imposed if, during the
sentencing phase, the factfinder takes into consideration “special
facts . . . that mitigate against imposing capital punishment,” such as the
unique characteristics of an individual capital defendant and the specific
circumstances of his crime.87 In the Court’s view, such an individualized
assessment of a capital defendant creates a certain amount of reliability that
a particular sentence is the most appropriate.88
Bifurcation of capital trials was also necessary for a second reason. In
addition to its proscription against arbitrariness, the Supreme Court’s
capital punishment decisions during this period also were animated by a
sense that the Eighth Amendment requires a certain level of respect for
human dignity. In the Court’s view, proper respect for human dignity
warrants specialized procedures in capital cases that might be unnecessary
in ordinary criminal trials. Thus, the Court ruled in Woodson v. North
Carolina that it was not enough merely to banish arbitrariness in capital
sentencing. While a mandatory death penalty scheme (i.e., one requiring
the imposition of the death penalty on all capital offenders) might
eliminate randomness from capital sentencing, the Court in Woodson ruled
that such a scheme would be unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment
because it would fail to recognize the uniqueness of each individual
defendant.89
While it may make sense, as a policy matter, to take into account the
individual characteristics of all criminal defendants during sentencing,
such individualized evaluations rise to the level of a constitutional
imperative in the capital context because “the penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”90
Thus, “fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty
of death.”91
86. LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 51
(LexisNexis) (2004).
87. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (citing Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975)). A sentencer
must consider, as mitigating evidence, “the circumstances of the crime and the criminal.” Id.
88. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (pluarlity opinion).
89. Id. at 304. Decided on the same day as Gregg, Woodson held that North Carolina’s
compulsory death penalty statute, which made the death penalty mandatory for all capital offenders,
was unconstitutional due to its “failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects
of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death.” Id. at 303.
90. Id. at 305.
91. Id. at 304 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although this excerpt from
Justice Stewart’s opinion represented only a plurality of the court in Woodson, the view that a
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Together, these two Eighth Amendment concerns—reliability and
respect for human dignity—led to the bifurcation of capital trials and to the
establishment of a capital defendant’s right to present mitigating evidence.
Since the resurrection of the death penalty in Gregg, the Court has never
equivocated on the bedrock proposition that a valid capital sentencing
scheme must permit a capital defendant to present mitigating evidence.92
It is worth noting that the right to present mitigating evidence is a
particularly broad right, encompassing almost any evidence that a
defendant might seek to introduce. Cosmetically, the test for relevance
during the sentencing phase appears to be no different than the general
evidentiary standard for admissibility: whether the evidence in question has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.”93 But the range of what might be
sentencer must consider mitigating evidence was embraced two years later by a majority of the
Court in Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all
capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and
record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice
is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
92. Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the
proposition that the ability of a capital defendant to introduce mitigation evidence and a sentencer’s
consideration of that evidence are constitutional prerequisites in any capital sentencing scheme. See,
e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275–76
(1998); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541
(1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1982). For instance, in Eddings, the Court
overturned a death sentence where the trial court refused to consider evidence of the defendant’s
upbringing and emotional disturbance. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115–17. The Court held that, while a
sentencer in a capital case need not assign any particular weight to the mitigating evidence
presented, as a matter of law, the sentencer must at least consider the evidence presented, and that
the failure to do so constitutes grounds for reversal of a sentence. Id. at 112. In California v. Brown,
the Court upheld a death sentence, but noted that a “capital defendant generally must be allowed to
introduce any relevant mitigating evidence” Brown, 479 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added). In Penry v.
Lynaugh, the Court reversed a death sentence because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it
could consider mitigating evidence concerning the defendant’s mental retardation and background
of abuse. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328. In Buchanan v. Angelone, the Court upheld another death
sentence but once again reiterated, “our cases have established that the sentencer may not be
precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence.” Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275-76. And in granting habeas relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel in Williams v. Taylor, the Court held that the defendant had “a constitutionally protected
right—to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover
or failed to offer.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 393,
93. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990) (observing that the “meaning of
relevance is no different in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing
proceeding”). I note, however, that during federal capital sentencing proceedings, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, including the relevance requirement under Rule 401, are inoperative. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(c) (2006).
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considered a fact that is “of consequence” in the mitigation context is quite
broad.94 Relevant mitigating evidence is understood to encompass virtually
any evidence that a defendant might seek to introduce, including: evidence
that the defendant played a minor role in the crime, had little or no criminal
record, or suffered from lasting effects of an abusive childhood or an
underlying mental disorder; or factors such as the age of the defendant, the
defendant’s remorse, or that the defendant can live peaceably in prison.95
The Court has placed only two limits on the range of permissible
mitigating evidence. A state or court may exclude: (1) pleas for sympathy
that are entirely “divorced from the evidence,”96 and (2) arguments based
on residual doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.97 But there is no requirement
that mitigating evidence bear a nexus to the crime before it can be
considered by the jury.98 This “low threshold for relevance”99 is consistent
with the Court’s dictate that “an individualized decision is essential in
capital cases” because the corrective mechanisms that are available with
other forms of punishment, are of course, unavailable in the capital
context.100 Thus, whereas questions of admissibility on grounds of
relevance are frequent concerns in ordinary criminal trials, the sentencing
phase of a capital trial can be something of a free-for-all for the defense, as
“the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant
mitigating evidence regarding ‘“his character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense.”’”101 The rule that a capital defendant faces
94. McKoy, 494 U.S. at 440 (holding that “relevant mitigating evidence” encompasses any
“evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder
could reasonably deem to have mitigating value”).
95. See id. at 437.
96. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542 (describing such pleas as “irrelevant evidence”).
97. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174 (1988) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion
in Franklin was unclear as to whether its ruling was based on the notion that residual doubt is not
appropriate mitigation or the idea that any residual doubt as to the defendant’s guilt had already
been adequately considered under the Texas death penalty statute, which required the sentencer to
consider causation and deliberateness in deciding to impose the death penalty. Id. at 169 n.3; see
also CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 86, at 143. However, the Court has since held in dicta that,
under Franklin, residual doubt is not appropriate mitigation evidence noting that “a majority agreed
that ‘residual doub[t]’ as to Franklin’s guilt was not a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor.”
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320 (1989).
98. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 286–87 (2004); see also Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S.
37, 44–45 (2004) (noting that such a nexus requirement was “never countenanced” by any of the
Court’s precedent).
99. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285.
100. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S 586, 605 (1978).
101. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604)) (emphasis added); see also Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114) (“We have held that a State cannot
preclude the sentencer from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence’ that the defendant
proffers in support of a sentence less than death. . . . [V]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant
mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances.”);
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almost no limits on the range of evidence that he can present during
sentencing has been referred to as the “no preclusion” principle.102
The broad scope of what courts consider to be relevant mitigating
evidence has many implications. Given that, for instance, the list of
aggravating factors that the prosecution can utilize in arguing for death
must be circumscribed by statute, the defense typically has a wider range of
admissible evidence at its disposal during sentencing. But there are less
obvious consequences as well. In some cases, a capital defendant might
refrain from presenting certain forms of relevant mitigating evidence. The
range of material that constitutes relevant mitigating evidence encompasses
everything from a defendant’s conduct during the offense to more personal
matters, such as the defendant’s childhood history of abuse or record of
mental illness or substance addiction—sensitive subjects for any person to
reveal in open court. Moreover, introducing such matters frequently
requires testimony from a defendant’s closest friends and relatives. It is
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that capital defendants sometimes seek to
prevent counsel from presenting certain forms of mitigating evidence.103
When counsel fails to present relevant mitigating evidence, however,
the factfinder is deprived of crucial information necessary to make a
reliable sentencing determination. Thus, while the no preclusion principle
is meant to provide defendants with a broad brush from which to argue
against the imposition of the death penalty, defendants may sometimes fail
to put on an adequate mitigation case by neglecting certain forms of
relevant mitigating evidence, risking unreliable sentencing results.
2. Consequences When Counsel Fails to Present Mitigating
Evidence
If a sentencer does not have an opportunity to hear mitigating evidence,
the death penalty becomes inevitable.104 If, at sentencing, the prosecution
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986) (holding that a trial judge cannot exclude
evidence of defendant’s good behavior in jail); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113–14 (reversing, where the
judge admitted into evidence, but refused to consider, testimony concerning the defendant’s
upbringing, and holding that “neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any
relevant mitigating evidence”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (holding that permissible mitigating
evidence extends to “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”) (emphasis added).
102. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 86, at 138–40.
103. See, e.g., Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2001). In Battenfield,
counsel failed to present substantial evidence concerning defendant’s personal character and
medical history, including a serious head injury subsequent to which he heavily abused alcohol and
drugs, which would have been introduced through defendant’s parents’ testimony. The defendant
refused to permit his parents to testify, stating that “they have been through enough,” and counsel
subsequently presented no evidence in mitigation.
104. With respect to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, there are two types of
death penalty statutes: weighing statutes and nonweighing or “threshold” statutes. California, for
instance, has a weighing statute, under which a sentencer weighs all evidence of aggravating factors
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presents evidence of aggravating factors tending to show that a defendant
“should” be put to death, but the defense does not respond with a case of
its own, the prosecution’s case goes uncontested and a death sentence is
the unavoidable result. Such situations raise obvious concerns under the
Eighth Amendment. If a constitutionally acceptable capital punishment
statute must provide for individualized sentencing determinations in order
to satisfy the twin goals of (1) respect for the dignity of each individual
facing the death penalty; and (2) reliability in the administration of capital
punishment,105 then these goals are undermined when the death penalty is
imposed automatically simply because counsel fails to present mitigating
evidence. In such situations, a “sentencer cannot give the defendant the
individualized consideration that the Eighth Amendment requires.”106
Quite obviously, if the Eighth Amendment requires that an individual
capital defendant’s dignity be respected through the consideration of the
defendant’s individual character and the unique circumstances of his crime,
that requirement cannot be satisfied where the important evidence is
omitted from the sentencing phase. As Linda Carter has argued, “[w]here
society’s interest in the reliability of the decision making process in death
penalty cases is manifested in an individualized determination based on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a waiver of one part of this
structure invalidates the delicately balanced protection for safeguarding
against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”107 This is not merely a
theoretical matter, as empirical evidence has demonstrated that wellpresented mitigating evidence can have a strong influence on a jury’s
deliberations.108
against any evidence of mitigating factors, and is required to impose the death penalty if it
determines that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 373
(1990) (upholding instruction which stated “[i]f you conclude that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death”). Similarly, Kansas’
weighing statute requires imposition of the death penalty if the aggravating and mitigating factors
are in equipoise. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 164 (2006). Virginia, meanwhile, has a
nonweighing statute, in which the presence of aggravating factors is a threshold issue to determine
whether or not the defendant is death eligible; and if so, all relevant evidence is considered in
determining whether or not the defendant receives the death penalty. See CARTER & KREITZBERG,
supra note 86, at 54 n.15 (quoting 2 VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, Instruction
No. P33.125 (2004)). Regardless of whether the statute at issue is a weighing statute or a
nonweighing one, the absence of any mitigation evidence makes a death sentence inevitable.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 84–92.
106. Laura A. Rosenwald, Death Wish: What Washington Courts Should Do When a Capital
Defendant Wants to Die, 68 WASH. L. REV. 735, 747 (1993); see also People v. Deere, 710 P.2d
925, 931–32 (Cal. 1985).
107. Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systematic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of CourtAppointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN.
L. REV. 95, 111 (1987).
108. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term, Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law and
Procedure, Sixth Amendment—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 121 HARV. L. REV. 255, 263
(2007) [hereinafter The Supreme Court, 2006 Term, Sixth Amendment] (citing Michelle E. Barnett
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Failure to present mitigating evidence also results in an incomplete
record that affects the reliability of further appellate and post-conviction
proceedings. This, in turn, raises additional Eighth Amendment concerns,
as reliable appellate proceedings constitute another essential feature of a
constitutionally permissible death penalty scheme.109 Many states require
appellate courts to conduct a proportionality review in capital cases, but
without the introduction of mitigating evidence during trial, a “reviewing
court cannot determine whether a sentence was proportional and
justified.”110 In sum, trial counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence
during sentencing undermines the very safeguards that the Supreme Court
has deemed essential to a constitutionally-acceptable capital punishment
scheme.111
3. The Relationship Between the Right to Present Mitigating
Evidence and Other Trial Rights
Waiver doctrine—and, more specifically, a knowing and voluntary
requirement—ought to be applied to a defendant’s right to present
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Waiver
et al., When Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating Evidence
on Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 764–66 (2004)); see also
Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1561–67 (1998) (describing the specific types of mitigating evidence jurors
tend to find persuasive); Brewer, supra note 24, at 342. But see Ursula Bentele & William J.
Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and
Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1041–53 (2002) (describing study results
indicating that “mitigating factors play a disturbingly minor role in jurors’ deliberations”).
109. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (noting that automatic appellate review in
capital cases was one of the key features of the Georgia death penalty statute); see supra text
accompanying notes 83–84.
110. Rosenwald, supra note 106, at 747.
111. While it is largely beyond the scope of this Article, I also note that situations where a
capital defendant declines to put on mitigating evidence and essentially accedes to the death penalty
raise an unrelated subsidiary policy concern: the acceptability of state-assisted suicide. An
individual who “volunteers” for the death penalty not only chooses death over life, but opts for the
state’s assistance in effectuating that choice. This was one of the concerns of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Deere, when it ruled—temporarily—that defense counsel in a capital
case is required to put on mitigation evidence, regardless of a defendant’s wishes. Deere, 710 P.2d
925, 930–31 (Cal. 1985). While I take no position in this Article on the ethics of physician- or stateassisted suicide generally, I note that death penalty volunteerism implicates these ethical issues.
Given the concerns that the Court has expressed regarding society’s interest in preventing suicide,
at least one commentator has argued that a capital defendant’s attempts to accede to the death
penalty would raise similar policy concerns. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–11
(1997) (observing that “opposition to and condemnation of suicide—and, therefore, of assisting
suicide—are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages,”
and noting the ethical dilemmas raised by involving doctors in the process of putting individuals to
death); Mary Pat Treuthart et al., Mitigation Evidence and Capital Cases in Washington: Proposals
for Change, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 241, 266–78 (2002).
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doctrine should apply because this right is similar in many respects to the
right to trial itself and implicates other constitutional rights of a criminal
defendant that are also subject to waiver doctrine. The sentencing
proceeding in a capital case is, in essence, a second trial. The penalty phase
follows the same structure as a standard criminal trial, featuring opening
statements, witnesses, exhibits, and closing arguments.112 A defendant has
the right to introduce evidence in the form of witness testimony, and to
testify on his own behalf. The same rights and constitutional protections
that are operative in standard criminal trials also apply to the penalty phase.
A defendant has the right to counsel, a privilege against self-incrimination,
the right to call witnesses, and the right to confront his accusers. The right
to present mitigating evidence is, in many ways, a right to a second trial.
And just like the right to trial itself, the right to present mitigating
evidence necessarily implicates a number of other constitutionally
protected rights.113 When a defendant in an ordinary criminal trial opts to
plead guilty and waive his right to trial, he necessarily waives these other
constitutional guarantees as well; waiver in that instance, therefore, carries
special significance, both because a defendant is essentially acceding to
punishment and because of the broad range of constitutional concerns
implicated.
The only difference between a standard criminal trial and the penalty
phase of a capital trial is the subject matter: whereas a standard criminal
trial is concerned with whether the prosecution has, beyond a reasonable
doubt, established the elements of the crime charged, the penalty phase of a
capital trial is concerned with whether the prosecution has established the
presence of sufficient aggravating factors, that, when weighed against
mitigating factors, merit the imposition of the death penalty. Put more
simply, rather than determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence, the
question is whether the defendant should be put to death or face some
lesser penalty. But this difference has no constitutional significance
meriting weaker procedural safeguards.114 If anything, the additional
Eighth Amendment concerns that are implicated would suggest the need
for more robust procedures.
It follows, then, that a capital defendant who purportedly waives his
right to present evidence during penalty proceedings should be entitled to
the same protections as a defendant who waives the right to trial altogether.
When a defendant seeks to waive adversary proceedings and accept
112. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 86, at 52.
113. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
114. Cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that aggravating factors that
determine a defendant’s sentence are analogous to the elements of a crime, which the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt).
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conviction of an ordinary crime, he can only do so upon a showing that he
understands the consequences of his actions and that his decision is
knowing and voluntary. It would therefore make little sense to permit a
capital defendant to waive adversary proceedings and accept a sentence of
death upon a lesser showing.
To be sure, this formalistic analogy is imperfect. Procedurally, a capital
defendant who is sentenced without the presentation of mitigating evidence
during the penalty phase could be seen as more akin to a defendant in an
ordinary criminal trial who simply rests after the prosecution’s case, rather
than a defendant who affirmatively waives trial by entering a guilty plea.
But as a practical matter, the failure to present mitigating evidence
renders the death penalty inevitable, just as surely as a guilty plea results in
a conviction. Moreover, the substantive foundations of the right to present
mitigating evidence and of the other constitutionally protected trial rights
currently covered by waiver doctrine are essentially identical. As explained
above, the chief rationale underpinning waiver doctrine is that accuracy in
criminal trials demands that a strict standard be applied to the waiver of
constitutionally protected trial rights.115 This need for reliability is, of
course, one of the principal concerns underlying Eighth Amendment
capital punishment jurisprudence, and led Justice Stewart to describe the
right of a capital defendant to present mitigating evidence as a
“constitutionally indispensable” feature of a valid capital sentencing
scheme.116 While ensuring fairness and reliability is, of course, a concern
that is present in any criminal trial, it is all the more pressing in the context
of the ultimate sanction—the qualitatively different nature of death as a
punishment creates a “corresponding difference in the need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.”117 Thus, if anything, the rationale for imposing a knowing and
voluntary requirement is only more compelling in the mitigation context.
In sum, there is no reason that the right to present mitigating evidence
should not merit the same strict protections already accorded to other trial
rights of criminal defendants.
4. Potential Criticism
Before turning back to Landrigan in order to see how waiver doctrine
should have been applied in that case, it is worth noting at least one
potential criticism of the analysis above. One could argue that, given the
importance of the constitutional rights at stake, waiver doctrine is
fundamentally flawed insofar as any waiver—regardless of whether it is
knowing and voluntary—results in unacceptable damage to the reliability
of criminal trials. Such an argument has even more force in the capital
115. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
116. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 305.
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context—after all, if the Eighth Amendment mandates that only the “worst
of the worst” receive the ultimate sanction, why should a capital defendant
be permitted to voluntarily subject himself to the death penalty by refusing
to present evidence that would enable a reliable sentencing determination?
The proposition that a capital defendant should be permitted to waive
mitigation is largely premised on an idealized conception of individual
autonomy—i.e., that a criminal defendant, as a rationally self-interested
actor, is the best judge of his own interests and should maintain authority
over decisions such as whether or not to exercise certain trial rights. This
idealized conception of autonomy, however, can be difficult to defend
either on a practical or a theoretical level. Practically speaking, it is hard to
think that any person who has just been convicted of a capital offense and
is faced with two options—life imprisonment or death—is “autonomous”
in the same sense that a person outside of the criminal justice system is
rationally self-interested. It is difficult to see how highly-functioning
individuals, let alone most capital defendants—who are frequently
indigent, suffer from cognitive deficits, have histories of substance abuse,
or are survivors of physical or sexual abuse118—could make life-altering
decisions in a rational manner so soon after such a momentous event. And,
empirically, the decisions made by capital defendants in just these
circumstances reveal that, as one might expect, defendants who have been
found guilty of capital murder frequently behave in ways that could hardly
be described as rationally self-interested.119
Moreover, even taking this idealized conception of autonomy at face
value, it is not obvious that, on a theoretical level, a defendant’s autonomy
should trump the societal interests embodied in the Eighth Amendment. If
the State cannot impose the death penalty arbitrarily, but only after a close
examination of a defendant’s character and record, it is unclear why a
defendant should be permitted to short-circuit this process by refusing to
present mitigating evidence. Given that, under the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the State has no authority to
impose certain penalties because those penalties are abhorrent to society’s
standards of decency, one could reasonably argue that a defendant should
not be permitted to invite the State to flout those standards.120 Viewed from
118. See LEE NORTON, Working Effectively with Capital Defendants:Identifying and Managing
Barriers to Communication, in MITIGATION INVESTIGATIONS IN CAPITAL CASES: PREVENTION
STRATEGIES AND MITIGATION TRAINING (The Center for Death Penalty Litigation ed.).
119. See Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row
Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 801 (2002) (noting anecdotal evidence that nearly all
capital defendants profess a preference for death at some point, but that the vast majority change
their minds).
120. The view that the State has no authority to impose certain punishments, regardless of a
defendant’s consent, has found voice in the dissenting opinions of Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 173 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Certainly a defendant’s consent to being drawn and quartered or burned at the stake would not
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this perspective, the application of a knowing and voluntary requirement in
this context ends up formalizing a process whereby a defendant, at best,
consents to a punishment that might otherwise be impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment, or, at worst, implicates the state in his own suicide.121
I am deeply sympathetic to arguments along these lines. Realistically,
however, the position that a capital defendant should never be permitted to
waive mitigation is foreclosed for the time being, at least in federal court.
Although in Faretta v. California,122 the Court did not directly address
license the State to exact such punishments.”); Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that capital defendant’s waiver of trial was invalid, on the
grounds that society’s interest that certain punishments are not to be administered “cannot be
overridden by a defendant’s purported waiver”); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that “the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not
privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment”). Several
commentators have also picked up on this thread. For instance, Jeffrey Kirchmeier has argued that
Eighth Amendment waivers should not be permitted for three reasons: (1) society’s interest in the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment ought not be overridden by consent; (2)
waivers of other constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial in the process of plea
bargaining, are permitted only because of the collateral benefits to society (in efficiency terms) and
to the individual defendant (who presumably receives something as part of the plea bargaining
process)—but there are no such collateral benefits to permitting an individual to subject himself to a
cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) permitting waiver of Eighth Amendment rights logically
permits absurdities—such as allowing rapists to submit to castration or thieves to having their hands
chopped off in exchange for lighter sentences—that the Eighth Amendment clearly would prohibit.
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 642–51 (2000). It is unclear whether the right of selfrepresentation articulated in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), necessarily encompasses
the right of a capital defendant to seek his own execution. Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the
Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at
Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM J. CRIM. L. 75, 84–85 (2002) (citing McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78 (1984)). One might also note that the Supreme Court has excluded
entire classes of individuals from receiving the death penalty, such as non-homicide offenders. See
generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008) (holding statute authorizing the
death sentence of a defendant who raped a child unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005) (holding death penalties given to juveniles are unconstitutional); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding death penalties given to the mentally retarded are
unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that rapists cannot be
sentenced to death). It hardly seems likely that a “waiver” would permit the execution of defendants
belonging to these categories. Although I propose a waiver colloquy as a solution to some of the
problems raised in this Article, I note that mentally retarded defendants present special challenges
for the administration of a waiver colloquy. One can imagine a situation where counsel has
discovered evidence that a defendant may be mentally retarded, which would categorically exclude
the defendant from the death penalty, but where the client instructs counsel not to present such
evidence. This scenario is particularly troublesome because Atkins did not establish a clear
procedure for determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–
18. Thus, it would seem that, even if courts were to permit a defendant to waive the presentation of
mitigating evidence, this waiver should not encompass evidence of factors that would categorically
exclude the defendant from the death penalty.
121. See supra note 111.
122. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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whether or not a defendant, proceeding pro se, has the right to present no
defense, a criminal defendant’s right to be the “master of his own defense,”
has been interpreted to include even situations where the defendant seeks
to put on no defense whatsoever, and even in the capital context.123 Given
that criminal defendants may generally waive trial rights expressly
guaranteed by the Constitution and that the Supreme Court has already
held that a capital defendant may forgo putting on a case during the guilt
phase of trial, it is difficult to see how the Court would not also hold that
the right to self-representation permits a capital defendant to forgo putting
on a case during the penalty phase of trial. While it has not so held
explicitly, the Supreme Court has, along with various lower courts,
routinely upheld death sentences imposed without the consideration of any
mitigating evidence.124
The basic rationale underlying these decisions is that because a
defendant has a constitutional right to control the shape of his own defense,
the defendant is free not to advance any arguments that he wishes to
forgo.125 And, indeed, an argument can be made that, in this particular
context more than any other, respect for the defendant’s dignity and
autonomy demands that he be able to control whether evidence is
presented. Not only are the stakes higher here than in any other proceeding,
but as we have seen, relevant mitigating evidence frequently encompasses
the most private matters in a defendant’s life.126 It is not hard to understand
why a defendant might, in some circumstances, prefer not to present
123. Id. at 836–87 & n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For instance, in Godinez v. Moran, the
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that it was improper for a trial court to accept a
guilty plea in a capital case. Godinez, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
124. See, e.g., Landrigan III, 550 U.S. 465, 472–73 (2002); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494
U.S. 299, 306–08, 306 n.4 (1990) (upholding death sentence where defendant “decided not to
present any proof of mitigating evidence during his sentencing proceedings”); Singleton v.
Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315, 1322 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant’s competent waiver of
mitigating evidence during penalty phase foreclosed challenge to the constitutionality of the death
penalty statute); People v. Bradford, 939 P.2d 259, 344–45 (Cal. 1997) (finding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing defendant to proceed pro se even though defendant made
clear that he would offer no mitigating evidence at the penalty phase); Akers v. Commonwealth,
535 S.E.2d 674, 676, 678 (Va. 2000) (upholding sentence where defendant pled guilty, told his
lawyers not to put on mitigation evidence, and argued for death); State v. Elledge, 26 P.3d 271, 276
(Wash. 2001) (upholding sentence where defendant pleaded guilty, and, during penalty phase, made
a statement to the jury asking for the death penalty); see also Treuthart et al., supra note 111, at
241–42 (describing the Elledge decision and noting that the jury imposed a death sentence without
hearing relevant mitigation evidence including Elledge’s family background, his insanity plea in a
previous murder trial, and the fact that he saved a prison guard’s life while incarcerated).
125. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1377 (1988)
(arguing that a “prisoner’s dignity” outweighs “the dignity of the law.”). I note, however, that if a
decision concerning whether or not to present certain forms of evidence is best characterized as a
strategic decision rather than as the exercise of a fundamental right, then it may properly be within
the purview of counsel’s authority, rather than the client’s.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 130–31.
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mitigating evidence, and that compelling a defendant to present such
evidence against his will could be viewed as a serious affront to his
dignity.
On the other hand, many forms of mitigating evidence can be
understood, in a broad sense, as evidence that tends to show that a
defendant is not autonomous. That is, the very purpose of many forms of
mitigating evidence is to show that, because of a defendant’s background
and history, he is not sufficiently culpable so as to merit a death sentence,
as opposed to, for instance, a defendant who committed a similar crime but
with deliberation and calculation. Viewed from this perspective, permitting
a waiver of mitigation allows a capital defendant to exercise his
“autonomy,” but only to the extent that he would withhold evidence that
his autonomy may have itself have been compromised.
While these philosophical issues are undoubtedly interesting, they are,
as a practical matter, simply moot. At present, there is not a single
jurisdiction in which, regardless of a defendant’s wishes, mitigating
evidence must be heard during every capital sentencing.127 The autonomy
of a criminal defendant is deemed so inviolable, that, for instance, the Fifth
Circuit has held that, where a defendant opts not to present mitigating
evidence, even the appointment of independent mitigation counsel would
127. I note several caveats. At various times, two states did have such a requirement in place.
New Jersey, prior to abolishing the death penalty in 2007 required mitigating evidence to be heard
in all capital trials. See Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2007; see also State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 993 (N.J. 1988) (holding that, because “the
state and its citizens have an overwhelming interest in insuring that there is no mistake in the
imposition of the death penalty,” mitigating evidence must be heard in all capital sentencing trials).
Rather than requiring defense counsel to present mitigating evidence in all cases, a member the New
Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a more proper solution would be the “‘appoint[ment of
independent] . . . counsel to call [witnesses with knowledge of mitigating evidence], and thereby
place on the record the mitigating evidence essential to a careful, balanced penalty determination.’”
Koedatich, 548 A.2d at 997 (Broussard, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Deere, 710 P.2d 925,
369 (Cal. 1985) (Grodin, J., concurring)). Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court ruled in the
1985 decision of People v. Deere that defense counsel in all capital trials must present a case in
mitigation because, separate and apart from a defense attorney’s obligations to his or her client, a
defense attorney is an “officer of the court . . . with a duty to assure that the court has all relevant
information to be able to perform its mandatory consideration of mitigating circumstances.” Deere,
710 P.2d at 933 n.5 (internal citation omitted). Deere had a short run as the law of California; it was
overruled a mere four years later in People v. Bloom on the grounds that, ethically, defense counsel
cannot work directly against his or her client’s wishes. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 718 (Cal. 1989); see
also People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 653 (Cal. 1989) (observing that requiring counsel to present
mitigating evidence in all cases “would be inconsistent with an attorney’s paramount duty of loyalty
to the client and would undermine the trust, essential for effective representation, existing between
attorney and client.”). Last, I note that, in Florida, although there is no requirement that mitigating
evidence be heard in open court during every sentencing, there is a requirement that a
comprehensive pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the State Department of Probation
in every case where a defendant refuses to present a mitigation case. See Muhammad v. State, 782
So. 2d 343, 363–64 (Fla. 2001).
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constitute an impermissible infringement on the defendant’s dignity.128 It
would seem, therefore, that whatever the theoretical and practical
drawbacks there are to applying waiver doctrine in the context of the right
to present mitigating evidence, courts would be unwilling to go so far as to
hold that a capital defendant may not engage in a valid waiver of
mitigation. At best, one could argue that, in many individual cases, there
may be competency grounds on which to challenge a defendant’s purported
waiver of mitigation.129 But a general rule prohibiting a defendant from
ever waiving his right to present mitigating evidence in any context
appears out of reach given existing precedent. The issue, therefore, is how
to thread the needle by respecting existing precedent concerning a capital
defendant’s autonomy, while also establishing procedures to make a
mitigation waiver less likely. In this context, a next best solution is to
ensure that any such waiver be restricted by an appropriately rigorous
knowing and voluntary requirement.
C. Landrigan Revisited
Turning back to Landrigan with this discussion in mind, at least two
flaws in the majority opinion become apparent: it failed to appreciate the
ambiguity of the record, and it ignored the basic principle that a waiver of a
constitutional right can only be valid if the defendant knows what he is
waiving. First, although the record showed that Landrigan did not want two
particular people—his mother and his ex-wife—to testify, it was far from
clear that he sought to waive his right to present any and all mitigating
evidence. Admittedly, the record is ambiguous—the majority’s conclusion
that the record tended to show that Landrigan sought to forgo all mitigating
evidence is not entirely implausible. But given the rule that courts should
indulge every presumption against the waiver of constitutionally protected
trial rights, it seems a mistake to convert what was, at most, a clear
decision not to present the testimony of two witnesses into a general
waiver of all evidence at sentencing. The very ambiguity of Landrigan’s
words highlights the need for clear standards and uniform procedures in
this context.
As we have seen, relevant mitigating evidence encompasses an almost
limitless range of information about a defendant’s character and personal
history. Oftentimes, the presentation of an adequate mitigation case can
128. United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district
court has no authority to appoint independent counsel to present mitigation evidence, on the
grounds that independent counsel’s presentation of mitigation evidence would deprive a defendant
of the right to control his own case); cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942) (holding that the Constitution does not require the appointment of an attorney for a
defendant who does not want the assistance of counsel, and noting that “the Constitution does not
force a lawyer upon a defendant”).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 166–67.
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require the disclosure of highly personal, extremely private information—
for instance, evidence of childhood abuse, mental illness, or substance
dependency. It is not difficult to see why a defendant—particularly one
who has only recently been found guilty of capital murder—might not want
to disclose information of such a personal nature in open court, or might
prefer not to ask witnesses such as close family members to testify about
such matters.130 In many cases,
capital defendants have numerous compelling reasons to
refuse to present some—but not all—mitigating evidence.
Defendants may experience “defensiveness, shame, [or]
repression,” regarding episodes of abuse. Psychiatrists have
observed that defendants are often hesitant to disclose to a
psychiatrist, or in open court, that they were mentally or
physically abused by a family member. Defendants may also
want to prevent certain—but not all—individuals from
testifying.131
Thus, although some capital defendants might seek to prevent the
introduction of certain forms of mitigating evidence, it does not necessarily
follow that all such defendants should be deemed to have waived their
right to contest the death penalty altogether. Landrigan illustrates why a
knowing and voluntary requirement is absolutely essential—if a defendant
is not informed about the possible consequences of waiver, he might fail to
present a mitigation case, not because he wishes to waive all evidence or
because he actually seeks the death penalty, but merely because he would
simply prefer that, all things being equal, certain forms of evidence not be
presented.
Second, even if the record were clear that Landrigan had in fact sought
to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence, Landrigan could not
have made a valid waiver precisely because his counsel had failed to
conduct a thorough mitigation investigation beforehand. Due to his
lawyer’s substandard investigation, Landrigan was not made aware of the
broad scope of relevant evidence that he could present at sentencing.132
This was the basic flaw at the center of Landrigan’s sentencing: his
counsel’s performance fell short of acceptable professional standards. It is
the responsibility of defense counsel not only to conduct a thorough
130. See Christopher Johnson, The Law’s Hard Choice: Self-Inflicted Injustice or LawyerInflicted Indignity, 93 KY. L.J. 39, 83 (2004) (citing Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 2003);
Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1997)) (“Some defendants try to keep any mitigating
witnesses from testifying, while still opposing imposition of a death sentence.”).
131. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term, Sixth Amendment, supra note 108, at 260 (internal
citations omitted).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
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mitigation investigation, but to inform a defendant about the choices with
which he is faced, and about the possible consequences of those choices.
As stated in the American Bar Association’s Guidelines for representation
in capital trials, defense counsel in a capital murder trial has an obligation
to conduct a mitigation investigation, regardless of the client’s stated
wishes.133 And here, Landrigan was unable to make an intelligent decision
because his defense attorney failed to fulfill his obligations adequately.
Yet the majority’s reasoning produced a result that can only be
described as circular: Landrigan’s counsel performed deficiently;
Landrigan, however, was barred from subsequently challenging his
sentence based on his counsel’s ineffectiveness because he did not, during
trial, indicate a desire to present certain forms of mitigating evidence. And
yet, Landrigan could not have done so in the first place; he lacked the
information necessary to make such a decision, precisely because his
counsel’s performance was deficient. His “waiver” of mitigation can hardly
be understood as knowing and intelligent because he did not know what it
was that he was waiving.134
Ultimately, the opinion in Landrigan creates a danger that courts, when
confronted with a defendant who opposes the introduction of certain types
of mitigating evidence, will find that the defendant has waived all
mitigation.135 Indeed, several lower courts have already cited Landrigan
for the proposition that, where a defendant interferes with counsel’s
presentation of mitigating evidence in some way, that defendant has
waived any subsequent claim to ineffective assistance based on deficient
performance at sentencing.136 This presents an intolerable risk that
defendants will be sentenced to death based on an incomplete record. If we
are to take seriously the rule that waivers of constitutionally protected trial
rights should not be assumed from an ambiguous record, then some sort of
procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that, consistent with existing
constitutional standards, a purported waiver of mitigation is valid.
133. See ABA, Guidelines, supra note 44, at 1015 (providing Guideline 10.7,regarding
counsel’s obligation to conduct a mitigation investigation).
134. Cf. United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1976)) (holding that defendant cannot waive access to Brady materials without
knowing to what evidence he would be waiving access) .
135. See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term, Sixth Amendment, supra note 108, at 264 (footnotes
omitted) (“Before the Landrigan ruling, some appellate courts would not have allowed a
defendant’s limited refusal to present certain testimony to convert into a blanket waiver, nor would
they have read such a refusal to justify counsel’s failure to investigate.”).
136. See Bishop v. Epps, 265 F. App’x 285, 292 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Because the district court
reasonably concluded that Bishop had instructed his counsel not to present mitigating evidence on
his behalf, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Bishop could not meet
statutory requirements for granting habeas relief.”); Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1205 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“[W]e follow the Court in drawing a distinction between a defendant’s passive noncooperation and his active instruction to counsel not to engage in certain conduct,” and finding
ineffectiveness claims precluded in the latter case).
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IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
REQUIREMENT

While it is clear that a knowing and voluntary requirement should be
applied to a purported waiver of mitigation, it is less clear how such a
requirement would operate in practice. For instance, once a knowing and
voluntary requirement has been established, courts could simply determine
after the fact on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant who purportedly
waived the right to present mitigating evidence did so validly. Such a
practice, however, would be burdensome and would risk producing
inconsistent results. Landrigan illustrates the inherent difficulties in
applying a case-by-case approach: even if a knowing and voluntary
standard were operative in Landrigan, the record was not at all clear
whether Landrigan sought to waive some mitigating evidence only, or
whether he sought to waive his mitigation case entirely. In sum, a case-bycase approach would be difficult to administer in practice, and would do
little to produce more consistent results.
A better solution would be for courts to adopt uniform procedures for
situations where a defendant indicates an affirmative desire not to present
mitigating evidence, or where counsel simply fails to present a mitigation
case altogether. More specifically, trial courts in capital cases should
conduct an on-the-record colloquy with a capital defendant in such
situations, modeled after a guilty plea colloquy, to ensure that the
defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary. Such a uniform requirement
would conform with procedures used in analogous situations, make
efficient use of judicial resources, and reduce the risk of arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty.
A. A Colloquy Procedure
In any ordinary criminal matter, when a defendant indicates an intention
to plead guilty and accept a conviction, he waives the right to a jury trial. In
such situations, it is a universal practice for a trial court to conduct an onthe-record colloquy with the defendant, not only to ensure that the
defendant understands that he has a right to proceed to trial and the
consequences of waiving that right, but also to establish a clear record for
appeal. In the event that the waiver’s validity is subsequently raised as an
issue, it is easier to resolve where such a record exists. It would make sense
to adapt this practice to situations where a defendant indicates a desire to
forgo the presentation of evidence during the penalty phase of trial.
1. Battenfield v. Gibson
The Tenth Circuit, in Battenfield v. Gibson,137 has already articulated a
clear and extensive colloquy requirement for situations where a capital
137. 236 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).
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defendant indicates an intention to forgo the presentation of mitigating
evidence. A brief recap of that case is instructive. Billy Ray Battenfield
was convicted of beating Donald Cantrell to death, and subsequently
presented no mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial.138
Battenfield’s trial counsel had spent very little time investigating possible
mitigating evidence or developing a strategy for the penalty phase;
unprepared once that phase began, his counsel planned to rely simply on an
appeal for mercy and on the testimony of Battenfield’s parents concerning
his childhood.139 Battenfield, however, refused to let his attorney put his
parents on the stand, and, without any other forms of mitigating evidence
at hand, defense counsel ultimately presented no real case at sentencing.140
Unlike a death penalty “volunteer,” Battenfield did not seek the death
penalty; he simply wanted to spare his parents further grief from having to
testify,141 telling the court that his parents had “been through enough.”142
After the penalty phase, the jury found the presence of two aggravating
factors: (1) that Battenfield’s crime was “heinous, atrocious, or cruel;” and
that (2) “Battenfield was a continuing threat to society.”143 The jury found
no mitigating factors. The trial court subsequently sentenced Battenfield to
death.144 On habeas review, Battenfield raised several claims, including a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase145
based on his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating
evidence, including Battenfield’s substance abuse and mental health
history.146 The state district court, in a ruling subsequently echoed by the
federal habeas court, held that Battenfield’s ineffectiveness claim was
procedurally barred based on a finding that he had voluntarily waived his
right to present mitigating evidence by opting not to have his parents
testify.147
The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for a new
sentence.148 The court took no issue with the mere fact that Battenfield
failed to present mitigation evidence; to the contrary, the court presumed
that a defendant could validly waive the right to present a mitigation case.
138. Id. at 1219.
139. Id. at 1227–28.
140. Id. at 1233–34.
141. Id. at 1230.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1219.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1220.
146. Id. at 1233–35.
147. Id. at 1226–27 (quoting Battenfield v. State, 953 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Okla. Crim. App.
1998) (noting that the state trial court held that Battenfield’s “allegations of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel are a direct result of Battenfield’s own refusal to testify and allow his parents to
testify.”).
148. Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1235 (10th Cir. 2001).
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The court held, however, that to the extent that Battenfield could be
described as having “waived” his right to present mitigating evidence, his
purported waiver was invalid, as there was no indication from the record
that he had ever been apprised of “the meaning of mitigation evidence or
what particular mitigation evidence was available in his case.”149 The
court’s holding was thus premised on the basic rule that when a defendant
waives the right to present mitigating evidence, the trial court must ensure,
as it must when a defendant seeks to waive other fundamental trial rights,
that the defendant has “sufficient information to knowingly waive his
right.”150 Because there was no such showing during Battenfield’s trial, his
so-called “waiver” was invalid, and his sentence was vacated.151
Battenfield illustrates that the reach of traditional ineffectiveness claims
in this arena is limited. In situations where defense counsel has failed to
investigate available mitigating evidence, one’s natural inclination might
be to say that defense counsel has been ineffective. But, without more
stringent guidelines for waiver in this context, it will be difficult to sustain
a claim of ineffectiveness unless the defendant actively takes issue with
counsel’s failure to perform an adequate mitigation investigation. Without
a clear rule requiring strict application of waiver doctrine, courts may
understand the defendant’s failure to do so as a “waiver,” thus precluding
an ineffectiveness claim, as the district court and state appellate courts did
in Battenfield’s case, and as the Supreme Court essentially did in Landrigan.
But the inquiry should not end there. Where trial counsel has not
performed a thorough investigation, a defendant will be unable during trial
to dispute the adequacy of his counsel’s mitigation investigation if he has
not been adequately informed about the nature and scope of permissible
mitigation evidence (i.e., if he does not understand what types of evidence
might be considered relevant in mitigation). And even armed with such an
understanding, a defendant cannot make an intelligent decision about what
mitigating evidence to present unless counsel has actually performed a
reasonable investigation and informed the defendant of his various options.
In the view of the Tenth Circuit, therefore, the district court put the cart
before the horse; it held that trial counsel was not ineffective because
Battenfield had waived his right to present mitigating evidence, but the
record did not establish that Battenfield knew that he even had a right to
present mitigating evidence during sentencing beyond his parent’s
testimony. This was precisely because Battenfield’s trial counsel failed to
inform him as to what evidence might be considered relevant, and did not
perform an adequate mitigation investigation. Without understanding what
mitigating evidence actually is, the role it plays in sentencing proceedings,
what mitigating evidence might actually be available in his particular case,
149. Id. at 1232.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 1233–34.
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a defendant cannot be said to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
present mitigating evidence. Battenfield’s alleged “waiver” of mitigation,
therefore, was invalid.
Notably, the Tenth Circuit reversed Battenfield’s sentence despite the
fact that the sentencing court, upon being informed that counsel would not
present mitigating evidence, asked Battenfield a few questions about this
choice:
THE COURT: It was my understanding that from visiting
with [defense counsel] Mr. Shook that you don’t even want to
put on any evidence as to mitigation; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:

You mean my parents and stuff?

THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT:
enough.

No, sir, they have been through

THE COURT: You’re not going to present any testimony as
to mitigation?
THE DEFENDANT:

No, sir.

THE COURT: You understand you have that right?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right, then we will proceed.152
The Court held that this limited questioning was insufficient to
establish that Battenfield’s waiver was valid; “[m]y parents and stuff” did
not translate into an adequate understanding of the right to present
mitigating evidence.153 Rather, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
transcript revealed that Battenfield “did not have a proper understanding of
the general nature of mitigating evidence or the specific types of mitigating
evidence that might be available for presentation.”154
The Tenth Circuit then held that when a defendant announces an
intention not to present mitigating evidence, a trial court must engage in a
much more extensive colloquy to ensure that the defendant’s waiver is

152. Id. at 1230–31.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1231.
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truly knowing and voluntary,155 endorsing a procedure first outlined by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Wallace v. State.156 Wallace held
that a trial court, when confronted with a capital defendant who fails to
present mitigating evidence or indicates an intention not to put on such
evidence, must: (1) inform the defendant of his right to present mitigating
evidence and explain what mitigating evidence is; (2) inquire both of the
defendant and his attorney whether he or she understands these rights; (3)
inquire of the attorney if he or she has attempted to determine whether any
mitigating evidence exists; (4) inquire what that mitigating evidence is; (5)
inquire of the defendant and make a determination on the record whether
the defendant understands the role of mitigating evidence in a capital
sentencing scheme; (6) inquire whether the defendant desires to waive his
or her right to present mitigating evidence; and (7) make findings on the
record regarding the defendant’s understanding and waiver of rights.157
Given the fundamental importance of mitigating evidence, each of these
steps is a matter of “little more than commonsense.”158 Steps (1) and (2)
are meant to inform the defendant of his right to present evidence that
weighs against the imposition of the death penalty, and to probe the
defendant’s basic understanding that he has that right. Steps (3) and (4)
drill down a bit deeper to determine whether defense counsel has actually
conducted an adequate mitigation investigation.159 A defendant, after all,
cannot knowingly waive his right to present mitigating evidence unless he
knows what evidence he is actually waiving. And counsel has an initial
responsibility to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation regardless
of the client’s ultimate decision about whether to go forward with such
evidence.160 These steps will also help clarify the appellate and postconviction record in the event that the thoroughness of counsel’s
155. Id. at 1233 (citing Wallace v. State, 893 P.2d 504, 512–13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)).
156. Wallace, 893 P.2d at 512–13.
157. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1232–33 (citing Wallace, 893 P.2d at 512).
158. Id. at 1233.
159. I note that, in situations where a defendant truly wishes that certain forms of mitigating
evidence not be presented (for example, if a defendant prefers not to disclose information
concerning his history of sexual abuse), there is some tension between this stage of the colloquy and
the defendant’s wishes. After all, if the defendant prefers not to air certain facts in open court, this
may necessarily limit the amount of detail with which counsel can describe their mitigation
investigation during the colloquy.
160. See ABA, Guidelines, supra note 44, at 1015 (providing Guideline 10.7 regarding
counsel’s obligation to conduct a mitigation investigation). I further note that the Guidelines state
that a competently performed mitigation investigation must encompass issues regarding the client’s
mental health. See id. at 951–52; see also id. at 952 (providing Guideline 4.1(A)(2) which provides
that “The defense team should contain at least one member qualified by training and experience to
screen individuals for the presence of mental or psychological disorders or impairments.”). The
need for an independent mental health investigation is particularly important in the context of a
waiver colloquy, because evidence concerning mental health issues would be relevant to any
competency determination if such a determination becomes necessary.
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investigation subsequently becomes an issue. That is, if the trial record
establishes that trial counsel conducted a thorough mitigation investigation,
resolution of any subsequent ineffectiveness claim during post-conviction
proceedings will be less difficult. On the other hand, if habeas counsel later
determines that a plethora of mitigating evidence existed that trial counsel
failed to uncover, or that trial counsel’s representations about the extent of
their mitigation investigation were inaccurate, the defendant’s waiver
colloquy would not serve to bar the defendant from bringing a subsequent
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, steps (5), (6), and (7)
allow the defendant to make his intentions with respect to the penalty
phase clear and further clarify the record for appellate and post-conviction
review. While there are, undoubtedly, other ways to inquire about a
defendant’s supposed wish to forgo mitigation, a uniform procedure along
these lines would clarify whether the defendant’s purported waiver is truly
valid.
I note, of course, that there may be sound policy and even
jurisprudential reasons for skepticism towards any situation where a
defendant essentially accedes to the death penalty. Regardless, a more
sweeping prohibition of the waiver of mitigation seems unlikely given the
state of waiver jurisprudence, as discussed, above.161 A much more
realistic solution to this problem would be to acknowledge that, although a
waiver of mitigation is permissible, the validity of any such purported
waiver must be verified along the lines outlined above.
2. Additional Policy Justifications
Beyond the obvious doctrinal considerations, a rule requiring an on-therecord colloquy along the lines sketched out in Battenfield would have
additional benefits. By helping ensure that a waiver of mitigation is
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, such a rule would likely reduce the
number of instances in which a defendant is sentenced without the
consideration of mitigating evidence, thus avoiding the attendant Eighth
Amendment concerns raised in such situations. Moreover, such a rule
would also promote accuracy and judicial economy.
As an initial matter, if a colloquy requirement were established, at least
some capital defendants who might otherwise be sentenced without
presenting mitigation evidence would have an opportunity to present such
evidence during the penalty phase. For those defendants who are not
sufficiently informed by trial counsel as to the scope of admissible
mitigation evidence, or whose trial counsel has not conducted an adequate
mitigation investigation, a colloquy will provide the defendant with an
opportunity to evaluate his options more intelligently or to direct his
attorney to conduct a more thorough mitigation investigation. For those
161. See supra text accompanying footnotes 123–28.
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defendants who at some point profess a desire to volunteer for the death
penalty, a colloquy will provide them with a last opportunity to reconsider
their decision before sentencing.162 I harbor no illusions; if we
acknowledge that defendants have a choice in this arena, some will
undoubtedly exercise the choice not to present mitigating evidence.
Nevertheless, a colloquy requirement might at least reduce the number of
instances in which capital defendants are sentenced without the
consideration of mitigating evidence, avoiding—in those cases, at least—
the Eighth Amendment concerns discussed previously.163
Second, a simple colloquy requirement would promote efficiency and
conserve judicial resources in several ways. For appellate courts reviewing
claims based on inadequate representation at sentencing, a uniform
colloquy requirement would clarify the trial record, by clearly establishing
the extent of defense counsel’s mitigation investigation. Furthermore,
where the adequacy of waiver is an issue, a standard colloquy could resolve
in each case whether a defendant’s waiver of mitigation was truly valid,
which would be substantially more efficient than requiring appellate courts
to make such determinations ex post on a case-by-case basis. Whereas the
current reliance on ineffectiveness claims to address inadequate mitigation
investigations by counsel works only retrospectively, a colloquy
requirement would work prospectively. Generally speaking, it is far better
to try to ensure that a trial record is accurate in the first place, rather than to
162. See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term, Sixth Amendment, supra note 108, at 262 (“[D]eath
penalty ‘volunteers’ often change their minds . . . . [C]ourts must be extremely careful to consider
the context of a defendant’s recalcitrant or obstructive behavior or apparent willingness to be put to
death before deciding that it constitutes an informed and competent decision to waive the right to
present mitigating evidence.”). While a colloquy requirement will not, of course, prevent a
defendant who is intent on dying from being sentenced to death, it will at least establish another
procedural hurdle for a purported death penalty volunteer relatively early in the capital punishment
process, when, arguably, society’s interest in preventing death penalty volunteerism is greatest. See
generally Casey, supra note 120, at 101–02 (“If there is little or no danger that an execution will be
inappropriate the state has a very weak interest in preventing that execution. On the other hand,
where there is a large danger that an execution will be inappropriate the state has a very strong
interest in preventing that execution . . . . The defendant’s interest in having her waiver accepted
becomes stronger the longer she awaits her uncertain execution and is faced with undue and
burdensome delays or the psychological punishment of being brought to the brink of death on
numerous occasions.”). Casey argues that it is later in the criminal justice process—i.e., on
appeal—where a defendant’s autonomy interest is strongest, and when—if ever—a defendant’s
waiver of the right to contest a death sentence is entitled to the most deference. Id. Prior to
sentencing, however, one cannot argue that a capital defendant has a unique “right to die”—a
defendant who has not yet been sentenced has not been “condemned” like a terminally ill patient,
but rather is like anyone else, with no right to demand death or to choose the type of punishment
endured. Id. at 100. Thus, even those who would argue that a capital defendant has an autonomy
interest that encompasses a right to opt for death must concede that the State’s interest in preventing
volunteerism weighs most strongly earlier in the capital process, justifying higher procedural
barriers to volunteerism than perhaps can be justified later in the process. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 104–11.
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attempt to correct errors retrospectively. If a mistake is not caught early,
particularly a factual error due to the incomplete development of the trial
record, it is unlikely to be discovered later.164
There are two possible criticisms of this view. On one hand, the use of a
standard waiver colloquy might be too efficient. That is, reviewing courts
might come to rely rigidly on the existence of a waiver colloquy as an
airtight mechanism to choke off any potential ineffectiveness claims. This
is certainly a legitimate concern, but one to which there are several
responses. First, in the wake of Landrigan, there is already a risk that
where the record is ambiguous, courts will too readily find a waiver.165
This ad hoc status quo hardly seems preferable to a standardized plea
colloquy. But more importantly, a defendant’s waiver of mitigation should
never be understood as knowing and voluntary if he was unaware of the
extent of available mitigating evidence at the time of sentencing. If, on
habeas, a petitioner can show that there existed substantial mitigating
evidence that his trial counsel had failed to uncover, this would have the
effect of invalidating a purported waiver. And if there is a dispute between
the defendant and trial counsel about the full extent of trial counsel’s
mitigation investigation, that issue could be probed during the postconviction hearing. This is all to say that a waiver colloquy, if employed
properly, should not choke off legitimate ineffectiveness claims.
On the other hand, a colloquy might not be efficient enough. A colloquy
requirement could result in an extended, resource-consuming inquiry, not
only to explore the issues directly raised during the colloquy itself, but also
subsidiary issues such as the defendant’s competence to engage in a
waiver. Given the stakes, however, a waiver of mitigation should not be
taken lightly, and there may be good reasons in many cases for doubting
the validity of a defendant’s purported wish to waive mitigation.166 Courts
should therefore not shy away from a competency evaluation when
necessary. I note, however, that in other contexts where a defendant seeks
to waive a fundamental constitutional right, a colloquy does not always
result in an unduly burdensome process; a court can usually conduct a
simple colloquy to determine the validity of a waiver without necessarily
engaging in an extensive competency evaluation each time (absent, that is,
any request for such an evaluation from counsel or other indication of the
defendant’s incompetence).167 Thus, a competency evaluation may not be
necessary in every case. This is not to say that the threshold for finding
indicia of incompetence need be particularly high, particularly in this
context.

164.
165.
166.
167.

See Casey, supra note 120, at 104.
See supra text accompanying note 136.
See supra text accompanying notes 130–62.
See, e.g., State v. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ohio 1999).
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Some would, no doubt, argue that anyone who wishes to waive
mitigation must, a fortiori, be incompetent. But, for reasons stated
previously, it is highly unlikely that courts would adopt a blanket rule to
prohibit the waiver of mitigation. Given that limitation, to argue that a
waiver of mitigation should be permitted only upon an affirmative showing
that the waiver is knowing and voluntary is merely to acknowledge the
reality that courts are unlikely to renounce the talismanic quality currently
accorded a capital defendant’s autonomy, and to seek a next best solution.
B. The Lower Court Split
Given the strong doctrinal and policy justifications, other courts should
follow the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Battenfield and establish a knowing
and voluntary requirement and an accompanying colloquy procedure for
situations in which a capital defendant purportedly waives the right to
present mitigating evidence. In absence of a clear ruling from the Supreme
Court, however, the lower courts have issued widely varying rulings on this
particular issue and have applied inconsistent standards in determining
when the right to mitigation has been validly waived.
On the one hand, a number of lower courts have sided with the Tenth
Circuit, holding that trial courts should conduct some sort of colloquy to
ensure that a waiver of mitigation is valid. But even amongst these rulings,
there is wide variation. The Third and Fourth Circuits, for instance, have
stopped short of requiring a specific colloquy, but have held that a lengthy
colloquy is generally sufficient to establish that a capital defendant’s
waiver of mitigation was knowing and voluntary.168 Meanwhile, the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits have gone slightly farther, by affirmatively holding
that a defendant’s purported mitigation waiver is always invalid in the
absence of some sort of colloquy with the trial court.169 Finally, a number
of state courts of last resort, including those of Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma,
and Tennessee, have gone even farther, holding that a waiver of mitigation
can only be valid after a trial court has conducted an extensive colloquy
with the defendant where the trial court: (1) informs the defendant of his
168. See Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 456 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is clear from Taylor’s many
colloquies with the trial court that he understood the consequences of not presenting mitigation
evidence.”); Chandler v. Greene, No. 97-27, 1998 WL 279344, at *4, 8 (4th Cir. May 20, 1998)
(holding defendant knowingly waived right to mitigation after “careful, lengthy questioning by
the court” regarding his right to present mitigation and the importance of mitigation as a literal
“matter of life and death”).
169. See Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that, absent an
extensive, on-the-record colloquy, the record could not “not support finding either that Petitioner
instructed his counsel not to present evidence at mitigation, or, even assuming such an instruction,
that Petitioner had any understanding of competing mitigation strategies”); Emerson v. Gramley, 91
F.3d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that, where the trial judge failed to warn a defendant “of the
fell consequences of failing to establish some mitigating circumstances, without which . . . a
sentence of death was certain,” the defendant’s purported a “waiver” of mitigation was invalid).
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right to present mitigating evidence; (2) explains the importance and role
of mitigation; (3) conducts an inquiry regarding the defendant’s
understanding of his rights and the nature of mitigation; and (4) makes
findings on the record establishing that the defendant’s waiver is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.170
In contrast to the courts mentioned above, however, a number of circuit
courts and state courts of last resort have rejected a colloquy requirement.
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, for instance, have found that a
defendant’s waiver of mitigation is valid, even where the trial court did not
extensively question the defendant about his decision.171 Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court of Washington has expressly held that “a trial court need
not conduct a ‘colloquy’ to ensure that a capital defendant’s decision to
waive the right to present mitigating evidence is a voluntary, intelligent,
and knowing choice.” The court reasoned that the choice as to whether or
not present mitigating evidence is, like any other decision made during the
course of a trial, a strategic choice within the defendant’s purview, and that
it is the responsibility of counsel, not the court, to advise a capital
defendant with respect to such strategic decisions.172 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of California has held that a defendant may waive
mitigation without any substantial colloquy before the trial court.173

170. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 560–61 (2004); Ashworth, 706
N.E.2d at 1237 (“[I]n a capital case, when a defendant wishes to waive the presentation of all
mitigating evidence, a trial court must conduct an inquiry of the defendant on the record to
determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary.”); Wallace v. State, 893 P.2d 504, 512–13
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 44 (Pa. 2008) (noting that
precedent established that “a properly preserved challenge to the validity of a waiver of mitigating
evidence is generally assessed by examining the thoroughness of the colloquy to ensure that the
defendant fully understood the nature of the right and the consequences of waiving the right”);
Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 660–61 (Tenn. 1998); see also Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d
246, 250 (Fla. 1993) (holding that when a defendant seeks to waive mitigation, a trial court must
ensure that the defendant’s waiver is valid by confirming on the record that counsel advised the
defendant concerning the right to present mitigating evidence and the importance of mitigation in a
capital sentencing scheme).
171. See, e.g., Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 549–50, 552 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding a
capital sentence despite a capital defendant’s limited knowledge of mitigation and the absence of
instruction on the issue from the trial court, because “no evidence showed that ‘Petitioner would
have changed his directions to his counsel had he been more fully informed about mitigating
evidence’”); Snell v. Lockhart, 14 F.3d 1289, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding waiver of mitigation
to be knowing and intelligent after only very limited questioning by the trial judge, during which
the trial judge did not explain what mitigation is or its importance in a capital trial).
172. State v. Woods, 23 P.3d 1046, 1073 (Wash. 2001).
173. See People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 709–10 (Cal. 1989) (upholding death sentence
imposed after counsel failed to present evidence during sentencing, where trial court did nothing
more than warn the defendant that it was “an enormous mistake” to waive mitigation, but did not
instruct the defendant concerning his right to present mitigation evidence, the extent of that right, or
the consequences of waiving that right).
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The wide variation amongst the lower courts with respect to this issue is
highly problematic. If there is a central idea behind the Supreme Court’s
modern death penalty jurisprudence, it is that arbitrariness in the
imposition of capital punishment is intolerable. The right to present
mitigating evidence is a key constitutional safeguard against arbitrariness
in capital sentencing. Surely, whether a defendant is able to exercise his
right to present mitigating evidence should not be subject to the vagaries of
geography.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the obvious doctrinal and policy justifications, and the confusion
amongst lower courts, the Supreme Court should (1) establish a
requirement that, in order for a capital defendant’s waiver of mitigation to
be valid, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that the
defendant’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and (2) require
an accompanying uniform colloquy procedure to ensure the validity of the
purported waiver. As with other fundamental trial rights, a valid waiver
should not be presumed from a silent record. Given the close analogy of
the right to present mitigating evidence to other trial rights of defendants,
and the essential role that mitigating evidence plays in a constitutionally
permissible capital punishment scheme, any other result would be
incongruous with well-established case law. The absence of more stringent
procedural safeguards surrounding the right to mitigation would render that
right as the lone constitutionally guaranteed trial right of a criminal
defendant that is not subject to a knowing and voluntary requirement. In
absence of such a ruling from the Supreme Court, lower courts should
follow the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Battenfield.
From a perspective of judicial economy alone, stronger procedural
safeguards make a great deal of sense: such safeguards will establish
uniformity amongst the lower courts’ treatment of this fundamental right,
and will clarify trial records for appellate and post-conviction review. But
most importantly, although a knowing and voluntary requirement and a
colloquy procedure will not ensure that mitigating evidence is presented in
all capital cases, they could reduce the number of capital defendants
sentenced to death without presenting a mitigation case, a phenomenon
abhorrent to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty.
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